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ABSTRACT
This paper supports the personal data platform cooperative as a means of 
bringing about John Rawls’s favoured institutional realisation of a just society, 
the property-owning democracy. It describes personal data platform coopera-
tives and applies Rawls’s political philosophy to analyse the institutional forms 
of a just society in relation to the economic power deriving from aggregating 
personal data. It argues that a society involving a significant number of personal 
data platform cooperatives will be more suitable to realising Rawls’s principle of 
fair equality of opportunity.
KEYWORDS Big data; justice; cooperatives; equality of opportunity; John Rawls
Introduction
Personal data is sometimes described as the new oil of the world economy. If 
it is true that personal data, especially in the context of so-called big data, 
plays the role of an important economic resource affecting the futures of 
individuals and countries, then the normative questions concerning big data 
are much broader than privacy and data protection. In fact, since they 
concern the distribution and creation of resources, they are questions of 
distributive justice. When evaluating the functioning of markets, most econ-
omists consider only the value of efficiency. In contrast, this paper applies 
John Rawls’s political philosophy, which proposes a concept of socioeco-
nomic justice that goes beyond efficiency. We advocate the personal data 
platform cooperative (PDPC) as a means to bring about Rawls’s favoured 
institutional realisation of justice, the property-owning democracy (POD).
We argue that a certain form of inequality in the data economy is 
a violation of Rawls’s principle of fair equality of opportunity (FEO). As 
Rawls argues, FEO is violated by economic institutions that place productive 
assets under the control of a relatively small sector of society. Rawls’s idea of 
the POD is intended to address this problem. Here, we explore a parallel 
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problem in the data economy1 and argue that an institutional order analo-
gous to a POD for data can be achieved with PDPCs.
The issue can also be described in terms of the pragmatic egalitarian political 
principle that productive assets should be distributed as widely as possible, as 
opposed to concentrated in few hands. The idea of predistribution has been 
discussed in both academic and policy circles as an alternative to ‘tax and 
redistribute’ welfare state capitalism (Hacker, 2015; Kerr, 2015; O’Neil, 2017). 
Predistribution aims ‘to focus on market reforms that encourage a more equal 
distribution of economic power and rewards even before government collects 
taxes or pays out benefits’ (Hacker, 2015). Predistributive policy is supported by 
the pragmatic argument that excessive reliance on tax-and-spend redistribu-
tion ‘fosters backlash, making taxes more salient and feeding into the conser-
vative critique that government simply meddles with “natural” market rewards’ 
(Hacker, 2015). Predistribution models emphasise the need to establish market 
correctives that achieve egalitarian outcomes by distributing control over 
productive resources, considering ex-post correctives to be a second-best 
alternative.2
This paper is not meant only as an addition to Rawlsian scholarship. Its 
conceptual innovations, especially the idea of pre-distributing the productive 
assets of the data economy, may appeal to those who are not committed to 
a Rawlsian view of social justice. Thus, this paper contributes to the broader 
transdisciplinary debate on the politics of big data.3
In this discussion, we consider only personal data, which we define custo-
marily as any data related to an identified or identifiable individual. It is 
important to stress that, as anticipated in EU law,4 the definition of personal 
data will evolve dynamically because data’s identifiability depends on what 
other data is available and the evolution of technology.
Moreover, our purpose here is not to provide a blueprint for the PDPC that 
is ready to be implemented. Since we aim to situate this proposal in relation 
to the politics of data, we focus on the concept of the PDPC and what 
distinguishes it from other models rather than on the details of its operations.
Finally, our proposal differs from others that seek to reorganise the data 
economy to promote justice (Cheneval, 2018) in that, p. 1) it does not 
promote the full ownership and control of individual data and 2) it focuses 
on the unequal distribution of what Rawls calls ‘prerogatives of authority and 
responsibility’ in the data economy rather than the unequal income deriving 
from them. The proposal differs from those that stress the personal owner-
ship of data in that it rests on the idea of the collective ownership and control 
of data-collection infrastructure. Moreover, our proposal frames collective 
ownership as a way to distribute the power to shape the online environments 
that subtly encourage (or ‘nudge’) citizens to share their data for further uses.
The paper unfolds as follows: Section 1 presents Rawls’s theory of justice 
and the POD as its institutional realisation in the context of the Rawlsian 
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criticism of welfare state capitalism. It also extends this criticism to the current 
data economy. Section 2 presents our proposal for organising the data 
economy, the personal data platform cooperative (PDPC). Section 3 describes 
a society in which PDPCs are significant economic actors that offer opportu-
nities to control large data assets to anyone who chooses so and with a stake 
in that particular data. It argues that such a society would approximate a form 
of POD and would be more likely to realise an approximation of FEO, at least 
in the data domain. Section 4 explains how the PDPC proposal represents an 
innovation relative to the privacy self-management paradigm.
Property-owning democracy and Rawlsian principles of justice
Today, the internet is dominated by large companies that produce and 
control vast quantities of personal data as a collateral effect of providing 
their services through the internet. The primary technological innovations 
responsible for this state of affairs are the internet and the smartphone. These 
technologies provide constant, global, real-time access to a wide variety of 
services such as maps, blogs, videos and internet searches. As a side effect 
(from the user’s perspective)5 of the interactions between platform compa-
nies and their customers, formidable amounts of data are collected.
The data produced and controlled by platform owners are considered 
a ‘new asset class’ (World Economic Forum & Bain & Company, Inc, 2011). 
The ability to control and benefit from such assets is marked by significant 
inequalities. First, there is an inequality in the ability to collect and control 
these personal data assets, as the internet contains only a few gatekeepers 
(Google, Facebook, etc.) who are uniquely positioned to do so. The gate-
keepers’ unique position derives from a combination of various network 
effects that make it difficult, if not impossible, to compete against the first 
company that significantly benefits from them. For example, it is difficult for 
a company to compete against Facebook by offering a similar product if it 
starts with a far smaller user base. In the case of social networks, the number 
of users determines the number of potential ‘friends’ each user can reach and 
thus adds value to the service.6 Similarly, Google Search benefits from a host 
of interlocking network effects: marketplace network effects (advertisers 
affiliated with Google can access individuals with the best profiles, while 
each advertiser contributes to profiling), data network effects (more data 
makes it easier to build an ecosystem of services around each user), recruiting 
network effects (more data supports better services that attract more people), 
and feedback network effects (the behaviour of users tells Google which 
search results are selected after typing a given search key, thus helping 
Google to identify the most fitting search results).7 Due to these network 
effects, many internet services markets (e.g., the search or social network 
markets) tend to be winner-takes-all.
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In today’s data exchange market, free services are exchanged for personal 
data. Typically, users are not fully aware of the various ways in which their 
data are used and cannot conceptualise the real economic value of the assets 
they produce. Users are only offered intangible and unquantified transactions 
with their data, which systematically and significantly complicates the rise of 
more favourable economic arrangements (Haynes & Carolyn Nguyen, 2014). 
Even if an individual were aware of the economic potential of their data, their 
control over the data would be too limited to make it economically rational8 
for a single individual to bargain with data collectors.
Let us grant for the sake of argument that the current data economy is as 
efficient as possible. That is, let us suppose that users of digital services obtain 
at least as much utility from free services as they could obtain in any 
arrangement requiring users to pay for services and companies to pay for 
users’ data. From the point of view of efficiency, there can be no argument 
against such an arrangement. However, Rawls’s argument for a POD reveals 
an important flaw in the current model: the concentration of economic power 
and the resulting concentration of political influence.
For a long time, this aspect of Rawls’s political theory attracted very little 
attention by commentators. The discussion has reflected a kind of standard 
assumption, more often implied than stated, that a just arrangement could be 
achieved by an ordinary, North European-style welfare-state capitalist society. 
The standard assumption was that Rawls’s society was another vision of 
a ‘slightly imaginary Sweden,’ to use Robert L. Heilbroner’s famous expression.
The last decade has witnessed a resurrection of Rawls’s critical stance against 
welfare state capitalism. Rawls admits that the least-advantaged individuals in this 
social configuration are better off compared to laissez-faire capitalism but claims 
that the system fails to satisfy all the requirements of his theory of justice. In 
societies where the means of production are privately owned, Rawls affirms, 
justice can only be achieved by a POD. While capitalism as we know it gives all 
citizens sufficient opportunities to achieve a decent life, it also enables a small 
class of property owners ‘to have a near monopoly of the means of production,’ 
even when capitalism is complemented by the generous welfare system of an 
‘imaginary Sweden’ (Rawls, 2001, p. 139). Thus, welfare state capitalism might lead 
to self-perpetuating economic and political inequalities (O’Neill, 2009). The posi-
tive features of welfare state capitalism include public support for various forms of 
social insurance, education and health care, which ensure that the basic needs of 
all citizens are adequately met. However, in welfare state capitalism, significant 
inequalities between citizens born in different strata of the population may persist 
and even grow indefinitely. Rawls doubts that capitalism can benefit the least- 
advantaged members of society through mere trickle-down effects. He also 
doubts that welfare state capitalism can benefit the least-advantaged to the 
degree required by the principles of his theory of justice. There are two main 
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reasons, in Rawls’s view, why welfare state capitalism fails to provide the institu-
tional bases of a just society:
(a) Citizens do not have similar opportunities to access positions that are 
characterised by the same prerogatives of authority and responsibility. 
This is a violation of the Rawlsian principle of FEO.9 When some have 
access to initial productive resources (e.g., through gifts and inheri-
tance) that others lack, it is extremely difficult to level the playing field 
(through the redistributive strategies of welfare state capitalism) in the 
competition for social positions.
(b) Redistributive policies, which may often be instrumental to satisfying 
the difference principle,10 cannot be implemented when they conflict 
with the interests of powerful economic elites (O’Neill, 2009).11
The FEO principle is extremely demanding. It would be satisfied in the 
current economy only if the state could neutralise the influence of social 
positions on individuals’ prospects of obtaining positions characterised by 
significant power and control of economic assets, including in the data assets. 
Rawls is keenly aware that the political target specified by FEO is extremely 
difficult to realise under ordinary capitalist institutions, including those that 
effectively protect and promote the interests of the economically worst-off 
members of society through state-supported social welfare. The reason that 
FEO is so hard to realise in a highly unequal society is that the initial 
advantages of those born in socially and economically advantaged social 
classes cannot be adequately compensated by welfare services. Even if the 
competition for scarce educational resources can be isolated from the influ-
ence of unequal material circumstances, the inequality-generating effects of 
intergenerationally transmitted cultural and social capital are much harder to 
mitigate (Bowles, 2005; Brighouse & Swift, 2006; Savage et al., 2015).
Rawls’s contrasting proposal is that of a property-owning democracy 
(POD). An economic arrangement is a POD if the economic system as a whole
tries to disperse the ownership of wealth and capital, and thus to prevent 
a small part of society from controlling the economy and thus indirectly political 
life itself. [. . .] The idea is not simply to assist those who lose out through 
accident or misfortune (although this must be done), but instead to put all 
citizens in a position to manage their own affairs and to take part in social 
cooperation on a footing of mutual respect under appropriately equal condi-
tions. (Rawls, 1999, xiv–xv)
An example Rawls often gives of a social institution appropriate for a POD is 
the taxation of large inheritances. If taxation applies to inheritance, and 
capital is redistributed at the beginning of an individual’s life, the economic 
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gap that will have to be filled by other kinds of social policy (e.g., public 
education) will be smaller.
Rawls argues that the principles of justice are most likely to be realised 
in a POD, rather than in welfare state capitalism (no matter how generous 
the level of welfare services). In a POD, citizens have private ownership 
over productive resources, but inheritance taxation prevents the concen-
tration and accumulation of great fortunes in the hands of the few. Hence 
Rawls’s characterisation of a POD in his penultimate work, Justice as 
Fairness: A Restatement, as a social configuration in which institutions
put in the hands of citizens generally, and not only a few, sufficient productive 
means for them to be fully cooperative members of a society on a footing of 
equality. (Rawls, 2001, p. 140)
We summarise the FEO-based argument for POD as follows: it is more difficult 
to reduce inequalities of opportunity between similarly talented and moti-
vated individuals (e.g., by improving education) in societies with very large 
initial inequalities.
In the current data economy, very few people gain opportunities to control 
significant amounts of personal data. In other words, the central capability of 
control over personal data assets is distributed very unequally across social 
positions. Most users of data-based services are only able to provide consent for 
specific uses of their own personal data, but they have no power to determine 
the uses for which their consent may be asked. By contrast, a few managers and 
owners of large companies (e.g., Mark Zuckerberg, who still owns the majority 
share of his public company; Hiltzik, 2019) exert a disproportionate amount of 
power and control over the terms and conditions of economic exchanges 
involving personal data. Moreover, policies that may be in place to promote 
FEO (e.g., education policy) cannot close the initial gap12 in access to positions 
that command substantial productive resources in the data economy.
Clearly, no plausible reading of FEO requires that all equally talented and 
motivated individuals have the same opportunities to exercise the authority 
to control every relevant domain of our life in which such authority is 
relevant. Indeed, there may be trade-offs in the degree to which opportunity 
can be equalised in various spheres of economic and social life. Mitigating 
inequality of opportunity in all competitions for all social positions equally 
may not be the most reasonable and just solution. However, in order for the 
FEO principle to have any normative salience, some inequalities in talent and 
motivation must be prioritised. Talent and motivation inequalities that reflect 
unequal social access to basic goods that are necessary to develop talents 
and motivations (such as education and health) are not permitted by FEO 
(Daniels, 1981). It is, however, difficult to determine once and for all what such 
basic goods are, as the definition of ‘basic goods’ is contingent and may differ 
between historical eras.13
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We speculate that control over data assets is one of the basic goods in 
question. Access to the central socioeconomic good of data assets is 
a resource that shapes an economic and social actor’s overall opportunities 
(affecting his or her chances of obtaining other prerogatives of authority and 
responsibility) and therefore especially relevant to justice. We contend that in 
both economics and politics, and possibly in other competitive spheres of 
social life, access to large data assets can be a crucial competitive advantage. 
Recent events such as the Cambridge Analytica scandal (Grassegger & 
Krogerus, 2016) show that better access to and control over large personal 
data assets produce competitive advantages in both economic and political 
competition.14
In summary, FEO is violated if individuals do not have similar core 
capabilities of data access and usage, which, in the current economic 
configuration, affect individuals’ chances of success in other competitive 
spheres.
We thus argue, by analogy with Rawls’s argument for POD, that FEO is 
more easily achieved if there are institutions that pre-distribute control of 
significant data assets more broadly. Clearly, the amount of authority avail-
able to every individual in society can never be equal to that of a CEO of an 
existing big data corporation. However, authority could be more widely 
distributed and thus diluted. In this way, inequalities of opportunity related 
to this central capability could be more easily mitigated, as we shall argue in 
Section 3.
The idea of personal data platform cooperatives
How can inequalities of opportunity in the control of significant data assets 
be mitigated? This is an especially challenging question given that personal 
data are not collected by a centralised body that simply collects the data that 
users provide. Rather, most valuable personal data are collected by particular 
businesses and organisations that track users’ interactions within their 
platforms.
The main strategy that we suggest as a means to deal with this 
problem begins with the observation that personal data are not a rival 
good.15 Digital data can be copied perfectly and inexpensively. They can 
be stored in different places and reused a potentially infinite number of 
times by anyone with the right hardware and technical and legally 
authorised access to the original information (or a copy of it). 
Furthermore, data collected by different businesses, organisations and 
platforms can often be linked to the same individual (again, with appro-
priate legal permission). Thus, data can be aggregated in a way that 
enhances their social and economic usefulness and productivity (as will 
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be discussed in Section 3 [Personal data platform cooperatives and prop-
erty-owning democracy]).
At the highest level of abstraction, personal data platform cooperatives 
(PDPC) provide a governance model for personal data aggregators and 
providers of data-driven services based on two essential features:
(A) a personal data management platform (PDMP) empowering indivi-
duals to collect, aggregate and control (copies of) their personal data 
from different sources (e.g., genomic data, e-health records, and 
e-commerce data), enabling clients to choose what data to share and 
with whom; and
(B) democratic procedures that enable cooperative members to make 
collective choices concerning:
(a) general data analytics capabilities, policies and ethical codes for 
data transactions and services delivered through the PDMP; and
(b) the deployment of surplus deriving from the secondary utilisation 
of data by third parties (e.g., for research, industry, or marketing 
purposes), once all costs associated with running the platform are 
deduced.
Cooperative members collectively exercise power over what kinds of data 
analytics capabilities, policies and ethical codes apply to data collected and 
controlled through the collectively owned platform. The following are exam-
ples of decisions that PDPC members would make collectively: whether 
genetic data should be collected by the platform, whether such data should 
be made accessible for commercial services in general, and whether transac-
tions involving genetic data with insurance companies should be allowed, 
and if so, in what form and with what constraints. While the cooperative as 
a whole defines the structure and possibilities enabled by the data-sharing 
environment, individuals make their own decisions about whether to share 
their personal data.
PDPCs are designed to empower individuals to control their own personal 
data while limiting such power through general policies and ethical codes 
voted on by democratic majorities (members’ general assemblies). As 
account holders, members control access to their data (as in a bank account, 
where individual data is individual money). As cooperative members, they 
control the sharing environment (how the data is measured, visualised, 
classified, and controlled) and the data-sharing limits (e.g., what type of 
data can be shared with specific categories of stakeholders) applicable to all 
members.
However, if data are like oil, PDMPs without personal data are like engines 
without fuel. For PDMPs to be of any use, end users must gain control over 
the personal data assets that they have donated, sometimes inadvertently, as 
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a collateral effect of previous online interactions. Here is where the right to 
obtain copies of one’s personal data enters the picture. Such rights have been 
conferred, for example, by the recent EU General Data Protection Regulation 
(Regulation on the protection, 2016), and in particular Article 20 concerning 
the right to data portability (Right to data portability, 2016).16 The right to 
data portability is the right to obtain data collected by private service provi-
ders in machine-readable form. It obliges private entities to make copies of 
personal data available to the data subject herself or to another company 
following the subject’s request. Currently, large platform corporations (e.g., 
Google and Facebook) comply with EU law and make it possible for their 
customers, including those outside the EU, to download a machine-readable 
copy of the personal data that they have collected.17
The idea of the PDPC departs from that of privacy self-management, which 
is based on notions of notice, access and consent regarding the collection, 
use and disclosure of personal data. The PDPC does not rely on the idea that 
‘people can decide for themselves how to weigh the costs and benefits of the 
collection, use, or disclosure of their information’ (Solove, 2012, p. 1880) in 
isolation from a community of some sort. Still, it retains certain features of the 
privacy self-management concept: each member (qua platform user) is asked 
for individual consent for specific uses of his or her data. In a PDPC, personal 
data can never be used and shared without the explicit informed consent of 
the individual. The consent given to a PDPC should not be wide consent 
authorizing a PDPC to use all data about an individual, but consent involving 
more granular sharing options, which can be dynamically updated and 
revoked (Budin-Ljøsne et al., 2017). With these granular consent options, 
members can make a specific subset of data available for certain purposes 
but not others.
Most importantly, however, PDPCs revise the privacy self-management 
concept in the direction of a community-management concept of the digital 
environment. Each member (qua cooperative member) has an equal say in 
defining the digital experience of data collection (e.g., the nudges built into 
the graphic design of a platform in the user journey and the choice of 
available options) affecting how their data are collected and how potential 
future uses are presented.18 Moreover, each member has an equal say about 
the constraints – most importantly, the ethical constraints – on new services 
and sharing opportunities offered through the platform.
This can be achieved in the current legal framework by technological 
platforms owned by cooperatives of data subjects. Cooperative governance 
is based on the customary cooperative rule of one share and one vote per 
member. While majoritarian decisions coerce minorities into accepting 
a specific way of shaping the digital environment for sharing as well as the 
available sharing options, this form of coercion can be justified because of its 
limits. First of all, PDPCs are chosen and voluntarily entered into (in Rawlsian 
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terms, they are free associations). Second, the constraints only apply to the 
data collected through the platform and the transactions implemented 
through them. Third, each cooperative member can exercise the right to 
obtain a copy of the data collected through the platform in a machine- 
readable format and leave the cooperative. Low-cost exit rights guarantee 
that there is no user lock-in and protect individual autonomy from the will of 
majorities that happen to form within the platform. Most importantly, data 
portability should enable a social world populated by a plurality of different 
PDPCs, each governing large data assets, not a single PDPC acting as a global 
monopolist for the entire world. Individuals shall be free to leave 
a cooperative (demanding the cancellation of their data) and may be able 
to join different PDPCs at the same time.
Note that it is not essential to our argument that all personal data about 
the same individual should be controllable by an IT infrastructure owned by 
a PDPC. The proposal is feasible as long as there are sufficiently large datasets 
of unmistakably personal data, people are aware of these datasets, and there 
are laws allowing people to obtain a copy of their personal data. The goal is 
not to control all the data a person may produce about herself. It is, rather, to 
provide shared significant control to a community (typically of individuals 
sharing similar interests and values) over a significant portion of data.
Personal data platform cooperatives and property-owning 
democracy
In this section, we advocate PDPCs from a Rawlsian perspective by showing 
that a PDPC-driven data democracy (PDDD) is preferable to the current data 
economy, from the standpoint of FEO. The PDDD is an ideal form of the data 
economy in which a large proportion of the users of data-based services are 
members of one or another data cooperative.
The argument for PDDD is structurally analogous to Rawls’s argument in 
support of POD. Rawls advocates a ‘regime in which land and capital are 
widely though not presumably equally held’ and ‘[s]ociety is not so divided 
that one fairly small sector controls the preponderance of productive 
resources’ (Rawls, 1999, p. 247). A society organised in this way is more likely 
to satisfy FEO than welfare state capitalism, as in the latter system assets may 
become highly concentrated over time. By analogy, the argument for a PDDD 
is based on the claim that an economic regime where most data transactions 
are controlled by PDPCs is more likely than the current data economy to 
satisfy FEO, as it would broaden access to large data assets and thus mitigate 
inequality of opportunity to control these assets.
For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a ‘pure PDDD,’ defined as 
a society where all personal-data-based services are provided by PDPCs and 
each user of a data-based service is also a member of the PDPC that offers it. 
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This is, of course, not a realistic scenario. Information is a non-rival good, so 
cooperative users’ control of one copy of their personal data through the 
PDPC does not eliminate the existence or continued use of other copies of the 
same data by other data controllers, including private companies. Moreover, 
PDPCs do not compete against private corporations that provide data-driven 
services for scarce informational resources, and they may even develop 
a symbiotic relationship with them. For example, users of PDPC services 
may transfer data to and from PDPCs and companies via data portability 
rights. In a mixed economy involving both private companies and PDPCs, the 
latter may not be predominant. Still, it is worth addressing the pure PDDD as 
an ideal type to see where the discussion leads. From the analysis of the pure 
PDDD, it may be possible to derive some indications of how a ‘mixed PDDD’ 
would work. A mixed PDDD would be a society containing many PDPCs, most 
of which play significant economic roles, that compete and collaborate with 
large private companies that of roughly equal economic importance.
How do PDPCs contribute to realising the conditions for POD in the 
information society? As argued in Section 1[Property-owning democracy 
and Rawlsian principles of justice], mere users are currently excluded from 
the layer of economic interactions in which profits are made: the secondary 
use of data. Moreover, mere users can decide whether to give their consent 
to terms and conditions and digital environments determining how data are 
collected and used; terms and conditions and digital environments are 
nowadays defined by companies, constrained by national and international 
laws, which are themselves shaped by democratic processes.
As argued in Section 2 [The idea of personal data platform cooperatives], 
PDPC members enjoy equal votes in the general assembly. In contrast to the 
current data economy, where authority and control over large data assets are 
concentrated in apical management roles and ownership roles, a PDDD offers 
opportunities for social roles with an intermediate amount of control over 
significant aggregations of data. Namely, in their role as a cooperative mem-
ber, a person would have an intermediate capability to control significant 
amounts of data; their degree of control would be intermediate between the 
capability of most individual citizens today and that of owners and managers 
of large data-driven companies. Unlike the owner or manager of a large data 
company, a PDPC member would have the amount of power and influence 
afforded by their single vote and their ability to persuade other cooperative 
members. As a result, in a pure PDDD, large portions of the population, as 
opposed to a small sector of society, would exert some control over the new 
productive asset class. A large ‘middle class’ of data control could thus be 
established.
Realistically, a mixed PDDD may still include large corporations and, within 
them, positions attached to greater power over aggregate data. However, this 
is not a fatal flaw of the model. By analogy, a POD may still include very rich 
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individuals (e.g., highly successful innovators and artists), but this is compa-
tible with FEO because it does not entail that a minority of citizens control 
most productive resources.
Having explored the structural analogies between a PDDD and a POD, let 
us now turn to the argument that FEO is more likely to be realised by a PDDD 
than by the current data economy.
The current data economy is a society in which authority over data is 
distributed very unequally, and it is thus defective from the standpoint of 
FEO. There are few positions of authority over aggregate data, and opportu-
nities characterised by access to large data resources are very unequally 
distributed. Realistically, policies that ‘level the playing field’ (e.g., through 
education), will not neutralise all inequalities of social class and birth. While 
opportunity inequality in the data economy could be ignored in the past, it 
has become more problematic as the control and exploitation of large data 
assets is increasingly central to success across multiple social domains. In 
other words, the control and exploitation of large data resources have 
become important determinants of other opportunities (e.g., social, eco-
nomic, and political opportunities). By contrast, in a pure PDDD, authority is 
widely distributed and all interested persons, irrespective of their ownership 
of capital assets, exercise some share of authority over large aggregates of 
data if they both have a desire to do so and are an interested party in those 
data (i.e. the data in question are their personal data, that is, data which are 
about them). The minimal cultural means necessary to use the opportunities 
offered by PDPC members could be delivered by public education. This 
would not pose an undue burden for the state, since it is reasonable that 
public school should finally educate persons about the nature and societal 
implications of data sharing, control and aggregation. Such education is 
required for citizens to use digital services in an informed manner.19 While 
people with vastly divergent interests will not be equally drawn to participate 
in PDPCs, this does not count as a violation of FEO, which requires similar 
opportunities only among people whose motivations (and initial talents) are 
similar.
While our leading normative justification for the data cooperative is equal-
ity of opportunity, not efficiency, other scholars have emphasised the poten-
tial of data cooperatives to create value. Consider the network effects 
(discussed in Section 1) that make it difficult for similar companies to com-
pete against Google and Facebook. Network effects are only one aspect of 
a broader phenomenon: the economic value of systematically aggregated 
data is much larger than the sum of its parts. This is true more generally, as 
data linkage enables ‘super-additive insights’ (OECD, 2014, p. 29). In other 
words, the ability to better contextualise data enhances the amount and 
quality of insight that can be derived from it. This phenomenon is the basis 
of the economic reason for distinguishing individual control of personal data 
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(which some individuals already have by virtue of data protection law) from 
the collective control of large data assets. PDPCs may enable the nonlinear, 
increasing returns of scale for the monetary, economic, and social value of 
data, which derives from their broad and systematic integration. As the 
number of records with which a single record can be compared increases, 
so does the value of each piece of information (OECD, 2013).
If this is true, data cooperatives could unlock the potential of personal 
data, which is currently unrealised because most data is collected in silos. In 
a PDPC, the cooperative member would provide the moral and legal author-
ity for the integration of all his or her personal data, enabling value creation 
through aggregation. Moreover, it has been argued that establishing data 
cooperatives in the health domain could accelerate research and its clinical 
applications (Blasimme et al., 2018). In contrast to aggregation by external 
entities, individuals would retain control over their aggregated data through 
the data management functions of the PDMP owned and operated by the 
PDPC (Section 2). Finally, the unlocked value of aggregated data would 
enhance the power and opportunities of all cooperative members as 
a collective, in contrast to the concentrated power and opportunities of 
today’s data aggregators. This would make society more just, since the latter 
configuration leads to great inequalities of economic opportunity and poli-
tical influence, while the former arrangement mitigates them.20
Beyond privacy self-management
In this section, we wish to emphasise how our model goes beyond the privacy 
self-management model. Since the establishment of the principles of fair 
information practice, privacy has been assumed to be a realisation of indivi-
dual autonomy, and individual autonomy has been understood as the result 
of endowing individuals with more information about the possible uses of 
their data. However, it has become increasingly clear that this solution is not 
feasible given the ubiquity of data and data transactions in the contemporary 
internet economy (Cate, 2006). In this environment, notice and consent 
practices can easily lead to information overload (e.g., informed consent 
notifications that many users simply avoid). There are simply too many data 
exchanges and too many uses for individuals to be able to review everything 
independently; privacy notices are like a distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) 
attack on our brain (Hartzog, 2018). Ultimately, data use decisions are deter-
mined by the nudges that are built-in to digital platforms (Hartzog, 2018; 
Weinmann et al., 2016).
Online choice architectures involve nudges because the visual layout, user 
journey, default settings, feedback mechanisms, and user dashboards of 
a web platform are unavoidable design elements and often constitute 
nudges, intentionally or unintentionally. The attention of the user of 
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a digital platform is a scarce resource. When an online artefact is built, design 
decisions affect the default choices and the attention economy of the user 
(Hartzog, 2018; Weinmann et al., 2016).
Hence, we argue that a fundamental aspect of agency in the internet 
environment and in a big data economy is having some form of control 
over the choice architecture within which data transactions occur. Data 
cooperatives would expand and equalise opportunities to control online 
choice architecture. Since control over a shared choice architecture implies 
imposing one arrangement onto many individuals, the problem of preference 
aggregation arises. In a dictatorial model, a single agent, or small group of 
agents, e.g., a management board, imposes a choice architecture for all other 
agents to use. By contrast, in a democratic model, experts develop alternative 
options that are ultimately voted on by cooperative members. The demo-
cratic solution delivers a low level of inequality between the users and 
designers of data-driven services that is compatible with a desirable degree 
of efficiency. Mitigating inequality in the ability to shape online environments 
is morally important because fundamental choices concerning the default 
settings, consent mechanisms and visual layouts of online platforms require 
balancing values (e.g., a design may privilege data privacy and data security, 
another design may nudge people into sharing more data more broadly) 
whose relative importance cannot be decided by technical considerations 
alone (Mirsch et al., 2017; Weinmann et al., 2016). An individual’s basic 
capability to control significant data assets also includes the higher-order 
capability to (democratically, collectively) shape the rules and nudges imple-
mented in the online environments affecting some (if not all) of the data 
transactions in which she or he is involved.
The idea of exercising economic power through not just data choices, but 
also through data interfaces, realizes one peculiar facet of predistribution in 
the data economy. What gets pre-distributed, in this case, is not an ordinary 
economic asset (something with a clear market value), but economic power 
in a more abstract form: the capacity to influence the behavioral process 
which generates data and influences their economic value.
Conclusion
Having presented Rawls’s idea of a property-owning democracy (POD) and its 
justification through Rawls’s second principle of justice, in particular fair 
equality of opportunity (FEO), we have worked out the implications of this 
vision for the socioeconomic institutions of a society in which personal data 
play a significant economic role. The possibility of a POD in a technologically 
advanced economy is threatened by the persistent and self-reinforcing con-
centration of economic power by dominant parties. Today, this is expressed 
in the concentration of the power to shape the digital environments affecting 
14 M. LOI ET AL.
the collection and repurposing of data, as well as the options for allowing 
data use, offered to average citizens. Options and digital environments are 
bundled and offered as take-it-or-leave-it options.
PDPCs are institutional tools that empower citizens to have authority not 
only over their personal data but also, through democratic procedures, on 
their digital environments and the options open to them. We have argued 
that, in a data economy where PDPCs control a significant proportion of 
(personal) data-based services, FEO is more likely to be achieved. This argu-
ment is structurally analogous to Rawls’s argument for a POD as the social 
institution most likely to satisfy FEO.
It may still be possible that a data economy with a significant role for 
PDPCs is not the only economic arrangement structurally analogous to 
a POD. Other institutions may contribute to the democratisation of power 
over big data. Still, the PDPC is at least one option deserving consideration.
Notes
1. Note that one may argue that the current data economy is unjust for other 
reasons, e.g., because it is discriminatory, opaque, monopolistic, exploitative, 
and manipulative (Custers et al., 2012; Pasquale, 2015). In this essay we choose 
to explore a particular Rawlsian, or predistributive, standpoint, as we believe it 
conceptualizes the existing injustice in a new light. Moreover, we do not argue 
that the PDPC can remove all forms of injustice in the data economy; the 
broader issues of injustice in the data economy deserve an analysis that 
would exceed the size of a journal article.
2. One important difference between the Rawlsian argument and the predistribu-
tion argument is that the former appeals to principles, while the latter is 
couched in pragmatic language. Predistribution theorists emphasise that, 
while it may be theoretically possible to achieve a synthesis of equality and 
efficiency through fair taxation and redistribution, such policies encounter 
strong resistance in practice. These theorists argue that an alternative 
approach – an initial redistribution of assets that otherwise contribute to 
generate highly unequal income over time – is at least worth exploring, as it 
may face less resistance.
3. The role of political philosophy in the debate has been developing while this 
paper was under review. See, for instance, Ferretti (2020), who considers the 
virtues of the platform cooperative model more generally and briefly touches 
on redistributing the benefits deriving from the cooperative’s access to aggre-
gate data. Our proposal falls fully within the ‘organizational strategy’ that 
Ferretti describes. In his defense of this strategy, Feretti also draws on the 
work of Martin O’Neill (2009) concerning the idea of a Rawlsian POD. See also 
Carballa Smichowski (2016) for an alternative policy proposal to create a data 
commons controlled by multi-stakeholder councils.
4. Recital 26 of the GDPR holds that ‘To determine whether a natural person is 
identifiable, account should be taken of all the means reasonably likely to be 
used [. . .], account should be taken of all objective factors, such as the costs of 
and the amount of time required for identification, taking into consideration 
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the available technology at the time of the processing and technological 
developments.’
5. In the current data economy, collecting data in order to predict and influence 
the (for now, mainly commercial) behaviour of internet users is for most 
companies the main business model, but it hides behind the appearance of 
being merely incidental.
6. It might be objected that Google may soon face serious competition by Bing, the 
Microsoft-powered search engine. This is the kind of exception that proves the rule: 
few companies are able to sustain the huge losses that Microsoft suffered for several 
years in order to get a chance to compete with Google, and even in this case, the 
possibility of competition only exists because Microsoft can exploit its dominance in 
the operating systems market (Cyran, n.d.).
7. This asymmetric relationship between those who collect, store and mine data and 
their targets is sometimes referred to as the ‘big data divide’ (Andrejevic, 2014).
8. Given the inability, for the individual user, to exploit the economies of scale 
(‘super-additive insights’) of the data economy, described towards the end of 
section 3. The data from a single individual is just a drop in the ocean and that 
converts into a relatively weak economic position.
9. This is the principle requiring that individuals with similar talents and abilities 
should have the same chances of obtaining positions of authority and respon-
sibility in society (Rawls, 1999, p. 72).
10. This is the principle that inequality should be justified insofar as it is necessary 
to improve the conditions of the least advantaged citizens. If a more equal 
distribution is possible that does not worsen conditions for the least advan-
taged citizens, the existing level of inequality is unjust (Rawls, 1999, p. 72).
11. See also Analyse and Kritik, 35(1), special issue on property-owning democracy, with 
essays from Samuel Freeman, Albert Waele, John E. Roemer, Martin Beckstein, Gavin 
Kerr, Ivo Walliman-Heimer, Tilo Wesche, Jan Narveson, Jahel Queralt, Michael 
G. Festl, Andrew Watson, Carina Fourie, Michael Schefczyk, Fabian Schuppert, 
Emilio Marti, Thad Williamson, Francis Cheneval, edited by Christoph Laszlo and 
Francis Cheneval (Cheneval & Laszlo, 2013).
12. The gap in question here is the gap between the children of the wealthy, 
socially networked, and cultured, and the children of the economically, socially, 
and culturally disadvantaged.
13. In the Rawlsian tradition, health has been identified as such a basic good 
(Daniels, 1981).
14. The relevance of opportunities provided by control over data assets in the context 
of political competition relates to the first principle of justice: the ‘equal liberty’ 
principle. Rawls requires the basic structure of society to satisfy the fair value of 
political liberties, which is formally analogous to fair equality of opportunity, requir-
ing fair opportunities to influence the political process (Rawls, 1999, p. 197).
15. A rival good is a type of good that may only be possessed or consumed by 
a single user.
16. However, Art. 20 fails to ensure user-centricity, as it is not clear that the user will 
be able to decide, for example, to transfer only a specified portion of his or her 
personal data.
17. An economic regime in which PDPCs play a significant role thus may arise by 
virtue of combining two social processes. On the one hand, data subjects 
should exercise their rights to obtain a copy of their data. On the other hand, 
individuals with a socially-oriented entrepreneurial mindset should be willing to 
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initiate PDPCs as founders and initial managers, building the infrastructure that 
enables the collection of personal data by large groups of citizens. University- 
funded scholars could also play a role by lending their skills to the execution of 
such projects. We believe that incentives for highly skilled individuals to take 
this role should be not only economic but also moral. Economic incentives are 
not excluded a priori, since, just like a company, a PDPC may assign to its 
managers a wage commensurate to their skills once it becomes profitable. 
However, thanks to the moral and idealistic appeal of the project, one may 
hope that the economic benefit necessary to motivate highly skilled individuals 
would be less than what large internet corporations need to spend to attract 
comparable talent.
18. Notice that control by democratic general assembly is not meant to suggest that 
members should make difficult decisions about technology and ethics without 
external aid. A cooperative may, for example, hire ethical and technology experts 
and take their suggestions into account before voting on specific proposals. Full- 
time executives are needed to both implement assembly’s decisions in practice and 
submit concrete, feasible proposals to the general assembly’s vote. However, the 
final authority for morally important and self-defining choices rests in the hands of 
the general assembly, where every member has one vote.
19. Still, unequal chances between persons with different levels of personal interest 
in the data economy are unavoidable. However, this irrelevant from the stand-
point of FEO, since inequalities between persons with different motivations do 
not count as FEO violations.
20. This claim appeals to Rawls’s FEO principle for the economic aspect and to the 
principle of the fair value of the political liberties (see footnote 14) for the 
political aspect.
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